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Heslop: Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH
("Lie-Detector")
EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO STIPULATION
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
have traditionally held that evidence pertaining to the
A
MRICAN
Iresults of a ie-detector test is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding
COURTS

on behalf of either the prosecution or defense.' Following this view, the
courts have held that it is a prejudicial error to permit comment upon
the mere fact that such a test was conducted 2 or upon the refusal or
willingness of a defendant to submit to one. 3 It has also been held that
a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not have a constitutional right
to have a lie-detector test administered to him.4 Some of the reasons relied
upon by the courts in rejecting the offer of lie-detector evidence have
been that the lie-detector cannot be cross-examined, 5 testimony pertaining
to such tests is inadmissible as hearsay, 6 it may unduly influence a jury,7
and it threatens to usurp the traditional role of the jury as ultimate finder
of fact.s However, the fundamental basis for this wholesale exclusion of
such evidence has been the refusal of the courts to recognize the lie-detector as a scientifically reliable method of ascertaining truth or deception.'
In recent years, however, a few jurisdictions have withdrawn from
the traditional approach and have admitted lie-detector evidence in
limited situations, notwithstanding objection by the adverse party. The
most significant of these decisions is that of the Arizona Supreme Court
in State v. Valdez' ° wherein it was observed: "Although much remains to
be done to perfect the lie detector as a means of determining credibility we

ISee, e.g., Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339 (D.C. Ariz. 1970); Kaminski v. State,
63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1963); People v Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 155 N.W. 2d 830
(1968); State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966); State v. Royster, 57
N.J. 427, 273 A.2d 574 (1971); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961);
Lee v. State, 455 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970).
2 People v. Nicholls, 44 I1.2d 533, 256 N.E.2d 818 (1970).
3 State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn.
209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 142 S.E.2d 484
(1965).
4 State v. Freeland, 125 N.W.2d 825 (Iowa 1964); Hyde v. Warden of Maryland
Penitentiary, 235 Md. 641, 202 A.2d 382 (1964); State ex 'el. Sheppard v. Koblenz,
174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962).
5 Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
6 United States v. Stromberg, 179 F.Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
7 State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
8 State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 178 N.E.2d 605 (1960).
9Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
1091 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
[235]
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think it has been developed to a state in which its results are probative
enough to warrant admissibility upon stipulation."'" The court thus held
that expert testimony based upon the results of lie-detector tests conducted
upon a defendant in a criminal proceeding is admissible in evidence
where, prior to such tests, the state and the defendant have so stipulated.
However, in absence of such stipulation, Arizona has retained the rule
that evidence of this nature may not be admitted over objection. 12
Currently, four other jurisdictions share the view expressed by the Valdez
decision and to this extent have departed from the traditional judicial
attitude toward the lie-detector as a source of competent and admissible
evidence in criminal cases.13
The Ohio courts have not, as yet, been called upon to decide this
issue. With regard to the general admissibility of lie-detector evidence, this
state has followed the rule of exclusion. 14 In Parker v. Friendt,15 a civil
action, it was held that such evidence is inadmissible in the absence of an
agreement between the parties. Whether or not this statement of the law
would have any effect in a criminal case where objection is raised has not
been decided. The Parker decision did infer, however, that the uniform
examination and licensing of lie-detector operators would be a prerequisite
to the general use of such evidence in a court of law. 16 This would
appear to be a desirable subject of legislation to which Ohio has not
addressed itself as yet. However, it is this writer's contention that the Ohio
courts should consider the admission of such evidence in the limited
situations approved in the Valdez species of decisions. Following the
standards established in these cases, it should be held that the state and
the defendant may mutually agree to waive the traditional view of
11 Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
12 State v. Sneed, 98 Ariz. 264, 403 P.2d 816 (1965).
13 Arizona: State v. Chambers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P.2d 27 (1969). California:People
v. Davis, 270 Cal. App.2d 847, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1969); People v. Houser, 85 Cal.
App.2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948). Florida:Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1969);
State v. Brown, 177 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1965). Iowa: State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89
(Iowa 1969); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960). Missouri:
State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
14 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F.Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
'5 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N.E.2d 216 (1954). Parker v. Friendt involved an action
upon a cognovit note. The defendant cross-petitioned to recover the amount paid
thereon claiming that she had signed the note in blank believing it to be a receipt.
Defendant submitted to a lie-detector test, the results of which were favorable to her
claim. The trial court's refusal to admit these results into evidence was affirmed
on appeal.
16 Id. at 337, 118 N.E.2d at 222:
Certain it is that inasmuch as the results of the test depend upon delicate
physiological reactions in response to psychological disturbances within an
individual, a court, called upon to pass upon the admissibility of such results
as evidence in a case, would have to insist that the person conducting the test
and testifying in court concerning it have sufficient training and knowledge
to fully understand the significance of these manifestations in the human body as
related to the subject under consideration of the mechanisms utilized as well
as broad experience in the operation of the instrument.
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inadmissibility and be permitted to admit lie-detector evidence pursuant
to a viable procedure designed to assure the reliability and competence of
such evidence. The discussion to follow will propose such a procedure.
It must be understood at the outset that no machine or device can
mechanically determine whether or not a particular individual is lying or
telling the truth in a given context. In this sense, the term "lie-detector"
is a misnomer. However, under proper conditions, truth or deception may
be diagnosed through the skilled interpretation of physiological data which
have been recorded by an instrument known as a "polygraph." 17 As its
name implies, the polygraph consists of a combination of instruments
which record pulse rate, blood pressure and respiration. These essential
elements may be supplemented by devices which can detect electrodermal
responses caused by increased activity of the sweat glands and muscular
pressures and movements. The rate and amplitude of these various
physiological reactions are in turn visually recorded upon a graph while
the subject is being questioned by the polygraph examiner. The polygraph
technique proceeds on the theory that, in most cases, a conscious attempt
to deceive by an individual in response to a question will cause measurable
changes in blood pressure, pulse rate, and breathing.18 The graphic record
of these variations, if any, may then be compared to the questions
propounded to the subject during the course of the examination. By
interpreting these results, an expert examiner may or may not arrive
at a conclusion as to whether or not the subject was responding to the
questions in a truthful or deceptive manner.
Thus, when we speak of "lie-detector evidence" we are actually
referring to the testimony of an expert witness regarding his conclusions
based upon the interpretation of physiological data recorded by a scientific
device. For this reason, it should be apparent that the competence of such
evidence is very much dependent upon the qualifications and experience
of the polygraph examiner. 19 In Ohio, expert testimony regarding scientific
tests has been held admissible where there is a foundation showing that
the test used was legally acceptable, that the particular apparatus used
was reliable, and that the test was conducted and the apparatus used in a
competent manner by a qualified person. 20 If the rule of admissibility
pursuant to stipulation is adopted, the polygraph technique would be

For an extensive and detailed study of the polygraph, its operation, and the
application of the "polygraph technique" of ascertaining truth and deception, see
17

F. INBAU & J. REID, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
18 J. RICHARDSON,

TECHNIQUE (1966).

MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 10.1 (1961).

Ill.2d 302, 309, 189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1963); "... Ilt is
common knowledge that the expertise of the operator and interpreter has substantial
bearing on the reliability of the polygraph."
20 See State v. Sickles, 250 Ohio App.2d 1, 265 N.E.2d 787 (1970) (breathalyzer
test); Columbus v. Marks, 118 Ohio App. 359, 194 N.E.2d 791 (1963) (blood test).
19People v. Zazzetta, 27
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considered legally acceptable and evidence pertaining thereto would be
admissible provided there has been shown a sufficient foundation therefor.
Whether or not an attorney, in preparing for the defense or
prosecution of a criminal case, will agree to the administration of a
polygraph test to the defendant and stipulate to the admissibility in
evidence of the results will inevitably depend upon the circumstances
of that particular case. In arriving at a decision, the attorney should
consider the defendant's willingness to submit to such a test, the
competence of the person who will administer the test and interpret
the results, and, most important, whether in light of other available
evidence, the testimony of the polygraph examiner will significantly aid
the finder of fact in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. 21
The latter consideration may be illustrated by several examples. In
prosecutions for crimes such as forgery, there may be substantial reliance
upon the testimony of handwriting and fingerprint experts. Like the
polygraph expert, their conclusions will be based upon the analysis and
interpretation of demonstrable physical impressions. In a proper case, the
expert testimony of a polygraph examiner might also aid the finder of fact
in reaching a decision as to whether the defendant is guilty of forgery. A
further example would be the case where the testimony offered by both
sides is in direct conflict. In this regard, consider the following situation.
A defendant has been indicted for the armed robbery of a store. The
state's evidence consists solely of the testimony of the proprietor and two
patrons who were present at the time of the alleged crime. These witnesses
are prepared to identify, at trial, the defendant as the man who committed
the robbery. On the other hand, the defendant has vigorously denied guilt
and claims that he was elsewhere at the time the robbery occurred. To
corroborate his story, the defendant has brought forward three alibi
witnesses who will testify on his behalf. At trial, the reliability and
credibility of all the testimony will be tested by cross-examination. In
the end, the ultimate decision of guilt or innocence will be left to the
jury who must ascertain the facts by weighing the credibility and
reliability of the witnesses.
However, if the defendant, with the advice of counsel, voluntarily
agrees to submit to a lie-detector test to affirm his denial of guilt, and
both the prosectitor and the defendant agree that the results should be
admissible at trial, should this agreement be upheld at trial when either
the prosecutor or defendant seeks to withdraw from his agreement? The
court could refuse, notwithstanding the agreement, on the ground that

21F. BAILEY &

H.

ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CIUMINAL CASES

1 366 (1970).
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2
the general rule against admissibility cannot be altered by agreement. 2
On the other hand, the court could venture to apply the Valdez approach

and exercise

its discretion to determine whether the agreement was

voluntary and the testimony of the polygraph examiner sufficiently
reliable to aid the jury in its fact-finding function.
The argument on behalf of the latter approach must deal with those
arguments which have persuaded the courts to hold such evidence
inadmissible in absence of stipulation. A frequent argument against
admissibility has been the failure of the proponent to lay a sufficient
23
foundation establishing the reliability and accuracy of the polygraph.
The judicial standard for the admission of such evidence was established
24
in Frye v. United States, which was decided in 1923. In that case it was
held that the scientific accuracy and reliability of the lie-detector has not
gained such general recognition and acceptance among psychologists and
physiologists to support the admission in evidence of expert testimony
25
based thereon. Whether or not the polygraph and the polygraph
technique have attained this degree of accuracy and reliability in the five
decades since Frye has largely been a matter of academic rather than
judicial debate.2 6 It should be noted, however, that the Standard laid down
in Frye has not gone unchallenged. Professor McCormick observes that
although the standard of "general scientific acceptance" may be a proper
condition upon a court's taking judicial notice of the accuracy of a
scientific device or method, the proper test for admissibility in evidence

22 Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alas. 1970); Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d
825 (Ky. 1957); State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 461 P.2d 919 (1969); State v.
Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8
N.W.2d 288 (1943).
23See People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); People v. Leone, 25
N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); Looper v. State, 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. 1963); Lee
v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1959). Contra, People v. Kenny,
167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938).
24293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
251d. at 1014:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.
26See generally Horvath & Reid, Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of
Truth and Deception, 62 J. CUIM. L. 276 (1971); Burkey, The Case Against the
Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855 (1965); Inbau & Reid, The Lie Detector Technique, A
Reliable and Valuable Investigative Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470 (1964); Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694
(1961); Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures,22 TENN.
L. RaV. 728 (1953); Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REV. 743
(1953); Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and Law oj Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV.
711 (1953).
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should be whether the device or method is acceptable to a substantial
body of scientific opinion.27 He concludes that if the latter standard were
applied, the polygraph and the polygraph technique would measure up
satisfactorily. 28 Professors Inbau and Reid have asserted that in its present
state of development, the accuracy and reliability of the polygraph
technique compares quite favorably to other judicially recognized
scientific techniques, such as psychiatric analysis, medical diagnosis and
prognosis, and the scientific examination of questioned documents,
fingerprinting, and handwriting.29 In making these observations, the
foregoing authorities have advocated the general admission in evidence
of the results of properly conducted polygraph examinations.3 0 These
observations are quite relevant to the discussion here, for the reason that
the argument is not advanced on behalf of admitting such evidence under
any circumstances, but rather for limited admissibility pursuant to
stipulation. In upholding the latter position, the Valdez decision expressly
rejected the general admission of polygraph evidence.31
However, where there has been a stipulation, voluntarily agreed
upon, the discretion of the court should be substituted for the rule of
exclusion.3 2 The court's discretion in determining whether such evidence
may be admitted should be exercised in accordance with flexible standards
designed to maximize the probative value and minimize the potential
dangers of expert testimony based upon the results of polygraph
examinations. These standards should pertain specifically to the form and
manner of stipulation, the prerequisites for admissibility, the mode of
presenting such testimony, the purposes for which the evidence may
be introduced and the weight and effect which should be accorded
such evidence by the trier of fact.
The initial consideration is directed to the formal substance of the
stipulation and the circumstances surrounding its execution in order to

27 C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 174 at 371 (1954).
281d. See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 10.6 (1961). Contra,
Skolnick, supra note 26.
29 INBAU & REED, supra note 17, at 255-56.
30Id. at 257:
The polygraph technique which we have described, when properly used by
competent, experienced examiners, possesses a very high degree of accuracy.
This we can conscientiously report from our experience in the examinations,
personally, or in the supervision of the polygraph examinations, of over 35,000
subjects. It is our view, therefore, that the results of a competently conducted
polygraph examination should be accepted as evidence.
31 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 280, 371 P.2d at 898:
Of course absolute infallibility is not the standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence. But at this time it seems wise to demand greater standardization of the
instrument, technique and examiner qualifications and the endorsement by a
larger segment of the psychology and physiology branches of science before
permitting general use of lie-detector evidence in court.
32 See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 1 174 at 373 (1954).
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33
determine whther there has been a valid stipulation of admissibility.
Although many details of the agreement should be framed according to
the particular case situation, the decisions in this area have indicated
certain formal requirements considered essential to a valid stipulation.
The first requirement is that the stipulation should be a formal, written
document which has been signed by the defendant, his counsel, and the
prosecuting attorney. 34 Oral stipulations, particularly where they are made
without the advice of counsel, should not be enforced. The most obvious
reason is the high potential for coercion and misunderstanding. In People
v. Zazzetta,35 the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the admission of
polygraph evidence pursuant to stipulation for the reason that such
agreement was orally entered upon the record in response to questioning
by the court.3 6 The same result was reached by a Kentucky Court of
3 7
Appeals in Conley v. Commonwealth, which observed that more
formality should be required to sustain the validity of an agreement of
such importance. It is agreed that because of the admittedly extraordinary
consequences of such an agreement the parties should manifest their
precise understanding and intent in the form of a written document. For
this reason, it is also necessary that the defendant be accorded at all
stages of this process the advice of counsel. Furthermore, the agreement
must be mutual in the sense that the persons who are party to and
affected by the stipulation should agree to its terms.

The second essential element of the stipulation is that it must
specifically provide for the defendant's voluntary submission to the
polygraph examination and for the admission in evidence of the examiner's
opinion based thereon as well as relevant material such as the graphic
38
recording of defendant's reactions. A stipulation of admissibility should
33 See appendix infra, for a model stipulation form drawn in accordance with the

standards discussed herein.
34 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
35 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963).
36 The questioning of defendant by the trial court in People v. Zazzetta proceeded as
follows:
Q. Is it your desire to have the lie test?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You heard the State's Attorney say in the event the result of the test is
unfavorable to you, then you intend to enter a plea of guilty?
A. I didn't say that, no.
Q. Or put in another way, in the event that the test turns out to be unfavorable
to you, and you still insist upon a jury trial, you are willing to stipulate in
open Court that it will be perfectly proper for the State's Attorney to offer
the result of the test in evidence on the trial of the case-you understand
that clearly?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you are so stipulating now?
A. Yes, sir.
Id. at 305, 189 N.E.2d at 262.
37 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957).
38 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
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not be implied where the agreement indicates only that defendant
consented to submit to a polygraph examination. 39 It is essential to the
validity of the stipulation that defendant understand that the results of
such test may be admitted only pursuant to stipulation and he should
be aware of the consequences if he so stipulates. As will be indicated in
the discussion to follow, such stipulation will not be conclusive upon the
admissibility of such evidence. The ultimate decision on this matter will
be subject to the discretion of the court. However, the stipulation may be
regarded as a prima facie indication that the parties have mutually
assented to the admission of the polygraph evidence and that the nature
and consequences of the stipulation were fully understood. Any agreement
which does not specifically provide for the admission in evidence of the
testimony and conclusions should not be enforced by the court.40
Certain waiver provisions should also be included in the stipulation.
First, there should be a provision for the knowing and intelligent waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment,41 and for the defendant's voluntary submission to the
polygraph examination. Whether the results of such tests are within
the scope of the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment has not been
decided by the courts. The assertion has been made that this protection
extends only to evidence of a testimonial nature and not to evidence of
a physical nature derived from examination or tests.4 As indicated
previously, the polygraph merely records graphically, physiological
reactions which are related to the subject's responses to questions asked
43
him during the examination. In Schmerber v. Caliornia,
the United
States Supreme Court held that the admission in evidence of an analysis of
blood withdrawn from a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated
did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination for the reason that
such evidence was neither communicative nor testimonial. On the basis of
this and similar decisions," one could argue that the results of polygraph
tests are physical rather than testimonial in nature. However, the analogy
of blood tests, handwriting samples, and line-up identifications to
mechanical means of assessing truth or deception is quite tenuous and has
See State v. Walker, 37 N.J. 208, 181 A.2d 1 (1962).
OSee State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947). The Supreme Court of
Kansas refused
39

4

to decide the question of whether or not polygraph evidence could be
admitted pursuant to stipulation for the reason that defendant had not agreed to the
admission of such evidence at trial but merely consented to a polygraph examination.
However, by way of dictum, the Court indicated that had there been a written
stipulation of full admissibility, their holding might have been otherwise.
41U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42 8 J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263
EVEDENCE 266 (1954).

(McNaughton Rev.

1961); C. MCCORMICK,

4384 U.S. 757 (1966).
44See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (appearance in line-up);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (taking of handwriting sample).
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not been drawn by the courts. The communicative elements inherent in
the polygraph technique and the nature of the evidence which it produces
may indeed compel observance of the right against testimonial
compulsion.4 1 Assuming, then, that an individual may have the right to
refuse to submit to a polygraph examination by invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination, we may also conclude that he may knowingly
4
and intelligently waive this right. 6
In addition to the preceding waiver, the stipulation should further
provide for the waiver of objection to the admissibility of such evidence
on the basis of the traditional view of exclusion. The defendant should
fully understand that such evidence may be admitted only if he so
stipulates prior to the examination. Such a waiver should not, however, be
so broadly construed as to foreclose any objection at trial based upon the
competency, accuracy and reliability of the particular examination given
defendant. Two pre-Valdez decisions affirming the admissibility of
polygraph evidence pursuant to stipulation so held on the basis that all
objections to reliability and accuracy were waived by virtue of the
stipulation. 47 For the purposes of the procedure described herein,
the stipulation should not so broadly foreclose any inquiry at trial
regarding the competence of the evidence offered.
Although the foregoing requirements may be regarded as essential
to valid stipulation, the true value of such an agreement lies in its detail
pertaining to the examination itself. The stipulation approved by the
48
Missouri court in State v. Fields illustrates this point. That agreement
specifically designated the individual who would administer the polygraph
test and interpret the results. It further provided that the named examiner
should, at trial, explain to the jury the nature of the test given, the
questions asked and the answers given, the responses of the defendant
as recorded by the polygraph and his conclusions, if any, formed on the
basis of his analysis of the test results. Finally, the stipulation specified
a list of questions pertaining to the crime which the defendant agreed to
answer. In this respect, we may observe a salient reason for admitting
polygraph testimony pursuant to stipulation. The parties may mutually
select and designate in the terms of their agreement the individual or
agency that is to give the test and testify at trial. The importance
of examiner qualification and expertise has been noted previously. The

45 See Skolnick, supra note 26.

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47 State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); People v. Houser, 85
Cal. App.2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948). The California court in Houser concluded that:
"It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on this appeal

to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an expert and as to the
results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to
indicate that he was not telling the truth." Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
48
State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1968).
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availability of expert polygraph examiners will be an important factor
in deciding whether or not a stipulation of this nature will be entered. In
addition the parties may, by the terms of their agreement, define the scope
of the testimony that is to be presented, as well as the nature of the test
which is to be administered. By designating those matters within the
permissible range of inquiry during the test, the parties may further insure
the relevance and probative value of the testimony to be presented. One
of the effects of such a detailed stipulation of admissibility is that the parties
may, in a sense, formulate the ground rules for the subsequent admission
of such evidence at trial. In this manner, the defendant will be more
fully aware of the consequences of his waiver and stipulation. Such
understanding would not necessarily be achieved where these matters have
been unilaterally determined without the consent and agreement of all the
parties affected thereby. In addition to these matters, it should be further
provided in the terms of the stipulation that the polygraph examiner may
testify only where he has been able to reach a definite conclusion as to truth
or deception. 49 Therefore, to insure the probative value of such testimony,
inconclusive results should not be brought to the attention of the jury.
Once a valid stipulation has been entered by the parties, the inquiry
should turn to the standards which guide the presentation of such evidence
at trial. Especially where the testimony of the examiner is unfavorable to
the defendant, we should consider whether due process of law, guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, 50 is denied by admitting evidence of this
nature. In order to insure the protections afforded by the Constitution, the
challenge is to devise a procedure of admission which may be deemed
"fundamentally fair" with respect to the rights of the accused. 51 Perhaps
the most significant qualification imposed by Valdez upon the offer of
polygraph testimony at trial provides:
That notwithstanding the stipulation, the admissibility of the test
results is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, i.e., if the trial
judge is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the
test was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse to accept
52
such evidence.
This limitation provides the keystone of the premise that, in the case of
a valid stipulation of full admissibility, the rule of exclusion should be
supplanted by the exercise of sound judicial discretion to determine the
competency of polygraph evidence. Whenever evidence of this nature
is offered by either the state or the defendant, the court should inquire, out
of the presence of the jury, as to the validity of the stipulation, the
49 See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51See, e.g., Rochin v. California,

174 at 373 (1954).
343

U.S. 165 (1952);

Lisenba v. California, 314

U.S. 219 (1941).
52 State v.

Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
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administration of the test, the competence of the testimony to be offered,
and the purposes for which it is to be offered.
The court should first determine whether the defendant voluntarily
consented to be examined by means of a polygraph test and knowingly
stipulated to the admissibility of evidence deduced therefrom. In the
process of this determination the court should inquire as to whether
the defendant voluntarily waived the right against self-incrimination and
whether he was represented by competent counsel at the time the
stipulation was entered. If these formal requirements for a valid stipulation
have not been complied with, or the terms of the agreement have
not been followed, the court should refuse to admit the testimony
of the polygraph examiner.
If, however, these formal requirements have been met, the court
should then consider whether the reliability of the test and the
qualifications of the operator are sufficient to justify the admission of such
evidence. At this stage the court should consider generally the foundation
for such testimony that will be presented upon direct examination. If,
after a searching inquiry into these matters, the court is convinced that
the testimony of the polygraph examiner will be that of a qualified expert
in the field, based upon a reasonably accurate and reliable method of
testing in this particular case, and that the probative value of such
testimony outweighs any prejudice that may result, the evidence should
be admitted pursuant to the terms of the stipulation.5 Conversely, if
the proponent of the evidence has not so convinced the court, the
stipulation should not be enforced.
Where the court concludes that the stipulation may be enforced,
certain standards must be observed when the polygraph evidence is
presented to the trier of fact. First, it should be held that the mere offer
in evidence of a written report made by the polygraph examiner should
not -be permitted unless the examiner is present at trial to testify. In People
54
v. Potts, the Illinois court cited Valdez in holding inadmissible the
written conclusions of the polygraph examiner where the examiner did not
testify and the report made no mention of the examiner's qualifications.
The most basic objections to such reports would be that they deny the
adverse party the right of cross-examination and that they are inadmissible
as hearsay. Since the reliability and accuracy of the polygraph technique is
critically dependent upon the person conducting the test, that individual
must be available for cross-examination regarding the method by which
he arrived at his conclusions.
In presenting this testimony, the proponent should establish a
sufficient foundation to inform the jury as to the examiner's expertise and
53 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §

174 at 373 (1954).

5474 Ill. App.2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966).
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experience in applying the polygraph technique and in interpreting the
results of such examinations. On this basis, the jury will be afforded
the opportunity to effectively evaluate the conclusions of the examiner
and to determine the proper weight and effect that should be accorded
such evidence. The direct examination of the polygraph witness in State
v. Fields55 illustrates a desirable mode of presenting such evidence. The
witness first testified as to his training and experience in the operation of
the polygraph machine and in the application of the polygraph technique
to interpret the results of such an examination. 56 He then proceeded to
describe the mechanical operation and theory of the polygraph and
explained that it contained instruments which recorded blood pressure,
pulse, respiration and galvanic skin reaction.57 The witness then gave a full
explanation of the method of questioning, the questions asked, and the
purpose of each question. The polygraph technique generally employs
three types of questions: "norm" questions to which the subject will give
a truthful response; "control" questions designed to elicit a deceptive
response to establish an abnormal reaction; and the "critical" questions
which pertain specifically to the matter of inquiry. 58 The witness in Fields
then testified that the defendant showed abnormal physiological reactions
on the polygraph when he responded to the "critical" questions that were
propounded to him.5 9 In conjunction with this testimony, the witness
exhibited to the jury the graphic tracings of these reactions and explained
their relation to the questions asked. At the discretion of the court these
graphs may be admitted into evidence along with the tesimony of the
examiner.60 On the basis of these results, the witness then stated his
conclusion that the defendant was deceptive or attempting deception
in his responses to the critical questions.
It is evident that the conclusions of the polygraph expert on the issue
of truth or deception is the salient evidentiary feature of such testimony.
Whether these conclusions will unduly, influence the jury or usurp its role

55434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).

56 Inbau & Reid, supra note 26, at 471, suggest that the examiner should have at least
six months of intensive individual training under the guidance of an experienced
polygraph examiner. This training should include instruction in relevant aspects of
psychology and physiology as well as experience in the interpretation of numerous
lie-detector test records in verified cases.
57
The components of the particular polygraph machine which is used are important
in determining its reliability in a case situation. Inbau & Reid state that any machine
which does not accurately record respiration, blood pressure and pulse is wholly
inadequate for the purpose of diagnosing truth or deception. Id. at 471.
8Id.
59 In State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968), the stipulated and material questions

concerned the commission of an armed robbery. The Court noted that the defendant
was asked, "did ... he participate in the robbery, did he point the gun at the men, was
he guilty of the robbery, did he receive any of the money, and was he an accessory
to the robbery." Id. at 511.
60 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
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as ultimate finder of fact61will depend upon the nature of the conclusion
that the witness is permitted to give. One of the dangers noted by the
courts in sustaining the rule of exclusion is that the conclusion of
the examiner may tend to be decisive upon the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence in a criminal case. 62 To obviate the potential for prejudicial
effect, the witness should not be permitted under any circumstances
to give an opinion as to whether the subject is guilty of or was involved
in the crime charged. 63
Upon completion of the direct testimony, it is essential that the
adversely affected party be afforded the opportunity to fully cross-examine
the polygraph examiner as to his qualifications and training, the conditions
under which the test was administered, the limits upon and potential error
in the polygraph technique and any other matters pertinent to the
accuracy and reliability of the testimony. 64 This will enable counsel and
jury to test the validity of the examiner's conclusions made on the basis of
the tests given the defendant and to place his testimony in its proper
perspective. The mere fact of stipulation and the decision of the court
to admit such evidence should not preclude such inquiry. The scope of
cross-examination may include questioning as to the various physiological
and psychological factors as well as extraneous influences which may
affect the results of the test. There might also be inquiry as to whether the
defendant was suffering any such disabilities at the time the test was
administered to him. If necessary, counsel should be permitted to inquire
further into the precise basis for the examiner's interpretations and
conclusions and to question the validity of the particular method employed.
Finally, our attention must focus upon the purposes for which this
testimony should be considered by the jury and the manner in which they
should be instructed regarding such testimony. The Valdez decision
expressly limits the use of such testimony to the corroboration of other
evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime, or, if the defendant
testifies, to impeach his testimony. 65 Conversely, where the test results are
favorable to the defendant, the evidence may be admitted for the purpose
of corroborating the defendant's testimony and impeaching that of his
accusers. In this respect, the jury should be so instructed. The instruction
should also inform the jury that the conclusions of the polygraph witness
do not prove or disprove any element of the crime but, at most, may only

6

1See State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); State v. Smith, 113 Ohio

App. 461, 178 N.E.2d 605 (1960).
62See State v. Hegel, 9 Ohio App.2d 12, 222 N.E.2d 666 (1964); Peterson v. State,
247 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Cr. 1951).
63 State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d at 94. Subject to this qualification, the Iowa court

approved the trial court's admission of polygraph testimony pursuant to stipulation.
64 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 901.
65 Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
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indicate whether or not the defendant was truthful or deceptive at the
time of the examination and that the jury should decide, in light of all
the evidence presented, the weight and effect that such evidence deserves. 66
Finally, the instruction should inform the jury that they may consider the
testimony of the polygraph examiner only if they find that the defendant
voluntarily consented to the examination and that his stipulation of
admissibility was made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. 67 Although flagrant abuses with regard to the preceding
should be excluded by the court at the outset, the jury should also be
permitted to consider this issue in their final deliberations.
The end result of the procedure described here is to present the trier
of fact with expert opinion based upon the application of the polygraph
technique to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. It is believed that this
approach presents a viable alternative to the traditional view that such
evidence may not be admitted under any circumstances. Its adoption
would afford the defendant, as well as the state, the opportunity to draw
upon this source of evidence if they deem it necessary to aid the difficult
process of determining guilt or innocence. This procedure is not initiated
unilaterally, but the admission of such evidence pursuant to stipulation
is critically dependent upon the willingness of the defendant to submit to
the polygraph examination. The effect of the stipulation is to waive the
rule of exclusion and substitute a standard of judicial discretion. In so
doing, the parties do not waive any and all objections to such evidence
but rather the reliability and competence of the technique as applied
is to be determined by the court.
The decision of whether or not to adopt the approach presented here
must critically evaluate the potential value of polygraph evidence along
with its potential dangers. In so doing, the courts of Ohio should determine
whether a procedure may be devised to maximize the value and ameliorate
the possible prejudices that may result. Observing that the polygraph
technique of diagnosing truth and deception may significantly aid the
difficult process of judicial fact-finding, Professor McCormick concludes:
"We cannot in our hearts be so confident of the reliability of the
present system of resolving conflicts in testimony by impeachment,
cross-examination and inferences from demeanor, that we can afford
to reject scientific aid in the task." 68
BRUCE C. HESLOP

66

Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 901.

67 In

State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa
provided in part: "If you find that the defendant
polygraph or lie-detector test and did not consent
might testify in court as to the results of said test,
to said test." Id. at 95.
68 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 1 174 at 370 (1954).
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APPENDIX
STIPULATION AND WAIVER FOR THE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF POLYGRAPH TEST RESULTS
, hereby voluntarily and willingly request
I,
(name of subject)
and consent that I be given a polygraph ("lie-detector") examination
(agency)
at
(dateof examination)
on
by
(examiner)
It is agreed and understood that during the course of said examination
I will be required to answer the following questions pertaining to
(date of crime)
which occurred on
(crime charged)

It is further understood that under the Constitutions of this State and the
United States, I have the right to remain silent and that by invoking
the right to remain silent I may refuse to answer any questions, including
those listed above, pertaining to the crime with which I have been
charged, and further, that I cannot be required or compelled to submit to
examination by the polygraph technique.
With full knowledge and understanding of these rights and
immunities, it is my desire to voluntarily and willingly waive the right to
remain silent and consent to submit to said examination. It is understood
that I may invoke the right to remain silent at any time prior to the
examination or during the examination. However, if, during the examination, I answer the questions asked me, I will be deemed to have waived
the right to remain silent.
It is further understood that the results of said polygraph examination may not be admitted in evidence in a court of law without the mutual
. With full knowledge of
consent of myself and the State of
is
the foregoing and with the understanding that the State of
a party to this agreement it is stipulated and agreed that:
1. The polygraph or lie-detector examination will be conducted
by (examiner) on (date of examination) at (agency)
which
(crime charged)
2. Said examination will pertain to the
and I agree to answer the
(date of crime)
occurred on
following questions,

3. If, on the basis of the results of said examination, the examiner
concludes that I have responded truthfully, his testimony as to
such conclusion may be admissible in evidence along with the
graphs and any other materials relevant to the examination,
results and interpretation thereof.
4. However, it is understood that if the examiner concludes that
I have responded in an untruthful manner, then his testimony as
to such conclusion may be admissible in evidence on behalf of
along with the graphs and any other
the State of
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materials relevant to the examination, results and interpretation
thereof.
5. If, on the basis of the results of said examination the examiner is
unable to reach a conclusion satisfactory to himself as to whether
my responses were truthful or deceptive then no evidence pertaining to said examination shall be presented at trial on behalf of
myself or the State of

6. The admission of such evidence in a court of law shall, notwithstanding this agreement, be subject to the discretion of the
court. If such evidence is admitted, it shall be so admitted only
for the purpose of corroborating and/or impeaching other
evidence presented at trial and that the opportunity of full
cross-examination will be permitted.
With full knowledge and understanding of the foregoing stipulations and waiver,
the undersigned hereby agree and so stipulate.
(Defendant)
(ProsecutingAttorney)
(Counsel for Defendant)
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